Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Giovanni B. Ramello
Author-Name: Francesco Silva

Title: History, statistics and theory: Frederic M. Scherer and modern industrial organization
Abstract: This short paper is an affectionate attempt to summarize in a few pages the career of Frederic M. Scherer who since more than five decades unremittingly holds a key role within the discipline labelled as Industrial Organization. Naturally the wide-ranging scholarship and the multi-faceted personality of Frederic M. Scherer inevitably loom large over this limited tribute.
Classification-JEL: L00, B30, B41
Keywords: Organizzazione industriale moderna, Frederic M. Scherer
Note: 
Pages:5-11
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50712&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001001
Number: 1

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Philippe Aghion

Title: Rationalizing Scherer?s prophecy of an inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation
Abstract: In this paper we develop a simple Schumpeterian growth model to rationalize the inverted-U relationship between competition and innovation uncovered by Scherer (1967). This model in turn delivers a number of testable prediction. A first testable prediction is that the relationship between competition and innovation follows an inverted- U pattern and the average technological gap within a sector increases with competition. A second prediction is that more intense competition enhances innovation in "frontier" firms but may discourage it in "non-frontier" firms. A third prediction is that there is complementarity between patent protection and product market competition in fostering innovation. More generally, recent attempts at verifying Scherer?s conjectures have given rise to a whole new trend of endogenous growth models aimed at being confronted with micro evidence.
Classification-JEL: O10, O11, O12, O30, O31, O33, O40
Keywords: Distruzione creatrice, competizione, innovazione, effetto di composizione, frontiera tecnologica, leader, ritardatario
Note: 
Pages:13-23
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50713&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001002
Number: 2

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Jhon T. Scott
Author-Name: Troy J. Scott

Title: Innovation rivalry: theory and empirics
Abstract: This paper develops the theory of a U relation between seller concentration and R&D investment and integrates the new theory with the traditional expectation of an inverted-U relation. The paper illustrates the U relation, and the integrated U and inverted- U relations, for a single type of R&D performed in most industries, exploiting differences in the degree of structural competition across industries while admitting little if any variation in the type of R&D.
Classification-JEL: L10, L20, O31, O32
Keywords: Innovazione, U rovesciata, ricerca e sviluppo (R&S), concentrazione del mercato, competizione schumpeteriana
Note: 
Pages:25-53
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50714&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001003
Number: 3

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: William S. Comanor
Author-Name: Stuart O. Schweitzer

Title: Pharmaceutical economics
Abstract: Pharmaceutical Economics encompasses the economics of the pharmaceutical industry but it is far more than that. Because pharmaceuticals have an important impact on public health, government actions are necessarily involved, which have a major effect on market outcomes. An important example is that the US generic pharmaceutical industry was largely created by 1984 legislation. The interaction of private incentives and government regulations has together determined pharmaceutical products, prices and quantities in both the branded and generic industries. In this paper, we review the extensive literature on these subjects from which one can draw conclusions regarding the performance of this important sector of the economy.
Classification-JEL: L65, I112, I118
Keywords: Regulatory structure, pharmaceutical reimbursement, generic pharmaceuticals, pharmaceutical industry, pharmaceutical marketing, pharmaceutical research and development, pharmaceutical mergers
Note: 
Pages:55-82
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50715&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001004
Number: 4

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Victor Ginsburgh
Author-Name: Stephane Ginsburgh

Title: Music, the brain, the mind, and the heart
Abstract: The paper draws on the aesthetic theory and on the cognitive neuroscience approach of music, as well as on music history to try to convince Frederic Scherer that he should listen to music composed after Mahler.
Classification-JEL: Z10, Z11
Keywords: Neuroscienza cognitiva della musica, filosofia della musica, storia della musica, musica del ventesimo secolo
Note: 
Pages:83-103
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50716&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001005
Number: 5

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Geoff Meeks Elzinga

Title: Frederic M. Scherer on vertical agreements: staking out the middle ground on resale price maintenance?
Abstract: This paper describes the influence of Frederic M. Scherer in the field of Industrial Organization. The emphasis is on Scherer?s research with regard to vertical agreements between a manufacturer and its downstream vendors, with particular focus on Scherer?s writings about resale price maintenance (RPM). Scherer?s views on RPM agreements are contrasted with the Chicago school?s liberality and the Warren Court?s stringency, showing how Scherer staked out a middle ground. The paper also assesses the influence of Scherer in moving US antitrust policy from its historic stance of treating RPM as per se illegal to its current treatment under the rule of reason.
Classification-JEL: L42, B31
Keywords: Mantenimento dei prezzi di rivendita, scuola di Chicago, free rider, giudizio Leegin
Note: 
Pages:105-119
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50717&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001006
Number: 6

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Geoff Meeks
Author-Name: J. Gay Meeks

Title: Mergers, accountants, and economic efficiency
Abstract: This paper explores some consequences for economic efficiency of creative accounting practices by merging companies. It assumes semi-strong information efficiency in the markets for capital and for corporate control; and/or the use of executive contracts relating pay to accounting profit. Ahead of takeover, prospective acquirers can flatter their earnings record in order to secure the support of investors for stock-for-stock deals. During takeover, accounting devices have been used to fill "cookie jars" ready to inflate earnings in the years after merger. After takeover, newly appointed managers can take a "big bath", at the expense of their predecessors? record, enhancing their own apparent performance. The consequences for economic efficiency can include: allocating control of a business to an inferior management team; cheating stockholders by distorting market prices; undermining markets as ?dishonest dealings drive honest dealings out of the market ? (Akerlof, 1970); creating incentives to undertake mergers which will not boost underlying profitability; and inhibiting the monitoring and control of agents by principals. The paper helps to explain the finding that the typical merger does not enhance operating performance, as shown for example in Ravenscraft and Scherer?s classic study.
Classification-JEL: L25
Keywords: Fusioni, gestione guadagni, contabilit? creativa, ente
Note: 
Pages:121-136
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50718&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001007
Number: 7

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: John Kwoka

Title: Structure, conduct, policy, and performance: the "simple model" of Frederic M. Scherer
Abstract: Prominent among F.M. Scherer?s many contributions to industrial economics and policy has been the analytical framework set out in his Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, first published in 1970 (Scherer, 1970). At the outset of that book, Scherer described what he termed a "simple model" of the relationship between underlying conditions, market structure, firm behavior, and economic performance. This essay makes clear that Scherer?s model was anything but simple: this model offered a unifying framework to a vast body of literature; it provided explicit causal - sometimes complex - linkages between its stages; and it had, and has continued to have, implications for competition policy across several decades. After discussion of the components of Scherer?s model, some of its implications are developed. These include the Horizontal Merger Guidelines, which reflect an emphasis on market structure together with a recognition of the importance of other considerations, and also remedies policies toward companies violating antitrust laws. Scherer?s co-authored brief on the Microsoft antitrust case is examined for its careful application of the "simple model" to a complex policy setting.
Classification-JEL: L1, L4
Keywords: Struttura del mercato, provvedimenti antitrust, linee guida in materia di fusione
Note: 
Pages:137-157
Volume: 2014/1
Year: 2014
Issue:1
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=50719&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:polipo:v:html10.3280/POLI2014-001008
Number: 8