Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name:  Bruno Jossa

Title: A Few Advantages of Economic Democracy
Abstract: The aim of this article is to discuss some of the main advantages of an employeemanaged system: a labour productivity edge on capitalistic businesses, the suppression of external firm control, slower monopoly-building and softer competition, the eclipse of the paramount role of economics in social evolution and a reduced need for state intervention into the economy. The author?s analysis sheds light on whether, and in what sense, economic democracy is a public good proper or just a "merit good". From the classification of cooperative as merit goods it follows that any government, regardless of political-economic orientation, should make it its task to support the growth of the democratic firm system by enforcing tax or credit benefits in its favour.
Classification-JEL: B5, P2, P50, P13
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:5-29
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41679&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101001
Number: 1

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Antonio Acconcia
Author-Name: Marcello D'Amato
Author-Name: Riccardo Martina

Title: Tax evasion and corruption: endogenous deterrence and the perverse effects of fines
Abstract: We consider a simple economy where self interested taxpayers have incentives to evade taxes and to escape sanctions by bribing public officials in charge of tax collection. However, tax collectors may be monitored by second-level inspectors whose incentives to exert detection activity are endogenously determined. In this framework, it is shown that the effects of classical deterrence instruments, such as fines, may be perverse; in particular, larger fines for corruption directly reduce corruption and indirectly reduce incentives to monitor it determining, as an overall effect, an increase in the underlying offence, that is tax evasion. Nevertheless, on the normative side, we show that, even if the Government cannot commit to a given level of deterrence, the maximal fine principle still holds.
Classification-JEL: H2, K4
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:31-53
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41680&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101002
Number: 2

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Alberto Zanni

Title: Economics or Political Economy? Marshall and Pareto as Mill?s Heirs
Abstract: The a. intends to demonstrate that Marshall and Pareto are descendants of S. Mill?s social science. To this end, he starts by answering a question neglected by experts on Marshall: Alfred and Mary Paley Marshall adopted "Economics" instead of "Political Economy" going on the basis of the "fundamental theorem of political science" legible in Mill?s System of Logic. As far as Pareto is concerned, the a. holds that: a) his maximum of utility in Sociology is as well tied to that "fundamental theorem" of Mill; b) Pareto had fully recognized his intellectual debt towards Mill. He did so by following a rule he had always respected, except for Cournot. The present essay is one of two the a. commits to two questions: which are Pareto?s intellectual debts? Has he always recognized them?
Classification-JEL: B13
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:55-65
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41681&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101003
Number: 3

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Maurizio Mistri

Title: International Economic Institutions, Institutional Complementarities and Institutionalized Linkages. The International Trade Case
Abstract: This paper analyses the forces at the base of the formation processes of international economic institutions following the fundamental New Institutional Economics (NIE) approach. In particular, the paper assumes that new international economic institutions respond to a principle of procedural rationality. This principle indicates that the formation of institutions takes place in an environment dominated by the bounded rationality of agents that produce institutions based on procedural knowledge accumulated over time. Particular attention is dedicated to the relationship between institutional innovation and economic growth. Specialized institutions stem from this relation, on par with the real economy, and generate more and more complex institutional systems. Within the institutionalist approach to the formation of institutions, the paper highlights Aoki?s concepts on "institutionalized linkages" and "institutional complementarity"; these concepts are then correlated to Schelling?s "strategy decomposition" concept; subsequently the forces that lead to institutional changes (Aoki and North) are analyzed. Specifically, in light of North?s approach, conditions are analyzed that determine changes in institutions governing international trade relations deriving from changes in some structural dimensions such as relative price systems. These changes are possible since governments can renegotiate original agreements giving rise to compensations.
Classification-JEL: B52, D71, F02
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:67-90
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41682&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101004
Number: 4

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name:  Margherita Scarlato

Title: Divari territoriali e driver della crescita nell'economia italiana: una nota
Abstract: The aim of this paper is to contribute with a new perspective to the long-standing debate on regional gaps in Italy. We first discuss the evolution of the drivers of growth for the Italian economy in the broad international context. Secondly, we analyse the implications for the different italian macro-regions. Last we draw some policy suggestions for the current planning cycle of the European Union regional policy.
Classification-JEL: O2, R11
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:91-102
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41683&Tipo=Articolo PDF
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Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101005
Number: 5

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: Vincenzo Giura

Title: Guido Jung: l'uomo e l'opera
Abstract: The article reviews a biography of Guido Jung, - one of the commercial middle class best known exponents in the South of Italy - who achieved a very important political position during the Fascist regime in the first half of the 20th century.
Classification-JEL: N00, N44
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:103-108
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41684&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101006
Number: 6

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: n.d.
Title: Recensioni
Abstract: 
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:109-121
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41685&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101007
Number: 7

Template-type: ReDIF-Article 1.0
Author-Name: n.d.
Title: Libri ricevuti
Abstract: 
Classification-JEL: 
Keywords: 
Note: 
Pages:123-123
Volume: 2010/101
Year: 2010
Issue:101
File-URL:http://www.francoangeli.it/riviste/Scheda_Rivista.aspx?IDArticolo=41686&Tipo=Articolo PDF
File-Format: text/HTML
Handle: RePEc:fan:steste:v:html10.3280/STE2010-101008
Number: 8