Carriere e "tornei" come incentivi nel pubblico impiego: una valutazione teorica alla luce dei recenti sviluppi normativi e contrattuali
Titolo Rivista: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Autori/Curatori: Nicola Meccheri
Anno di pubblicazione: 2000 Fascicolo: 3 Lingua: Italiano
Numero pagine: 25
Dimensione file: 134 KB
In this paper the possibility to introduce high-powered incentive schemes in public organizations is analyzed taking into account the attempts to reform public service in Italy since Dlgs n. 29/93 until the most recent normative and contractual developments. A simple formal model of promotions is presented and is examined by introducing typical features of public employment such as pensions, lateral entry restrictions and job security. From this model it emerges that with a well-defined system of promotions it is possible to introduce high-powered incentives even when dismissal is not an issue and out-put is hard to measure. In this perspective the last part of the paper is concerned with "tournaments" as means to define promotions. It is pointed out what could be the advantages and the disadvantages of using tournaments in the public sector especially when public employees are risk-adverse as empirical evidence seems to confirm.
Nicola Meccheri, in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 3/2000, pp. , DOI: