Wittgenstein’s Deflationism - In this paper, I will aim at clarifying up to what extent the later Wittgenstein is a deflationist. I will claim that he is a (moderate) ontological but not a metaphysical deflationist. Up to a certain point, his moderate ontological deflationism amounts to a grammatical ontological deflationism. In its turn, this deflationism can be equated with a form of idealism. Moreover, once such a deflationism is combined with his metaphysical inflationism, i.e., grammatical essentialism, Wittgenstein turns out to be an internal realist. Finally, with respect to Glock’s tripartition between objectual, linguistic and existential deflationism, this way of putting things will enable me to negatively answer the question of whether Wittgenstein is either an objectual or a linguistic deflationist. This leaves the possibility open that he is an existential deflationist.