This essay offers an analytical reconstruction - based on a variety of Italian and American sources (US Department of State’s documentation, Christian Democratic Party’s documents, party press, parliamentary debates, memoirs, etc.) and, above all, on Moro’s documents - of Aldo Moro’s attitude towards Italian terrorism and subversive phenomena from 1969 to 1978. The author singles out the elements which mostly - and constantly - characterized Moro’s attitude and reflections about political violence and terrorism. First of all, he points out the immediateness with which Moro understood the novelty and the danger of terrorism. Secondly, the author underlines Moro’s firm belief that terrorism was essentially a political phenomenon and that, therefore, it had to be dealt with not only through repressive measures but above all through a strong political strategy. The essay reconstructs Moro’s analyses and judgments (and their evolution during the Seventies) with regard both to "black" terrorism and to "red" terrorism, and compares them with the opinions of the other Christian Democratic leaders. Furthermore, the author highlights Moro’s persuasion that both left-wing terrorism and right-wing terrorism had international ties and were probably supported by some foreign nations. Finally, the author deals briefly with the eventual impact of terrorism on Moro’s political strategy towards the Italian Communist Party.
Keywords: Aldo Moro, Italian right-wing terrorism, subversive phenomena, Red Brigades, Christian Democratic Party, Italian Communist Party