Collective labour law, freezed as it is within classical labour law handbooks, is changing to the total loss of its original profile. This change is due to the institutional pressure of a "de facto" presidentialism and to an increasing EU control, up to the limit of an authentic expropriation of any chance of intervention, not just monetary, but even financial, with the consequent end of the consultation practice. At the same time, the 1995 Referendum, while cancelling art. 19, let. a, of the "Statuto dei lavoratori", swept away the promotional policy of the "Statuto", the so-called delegated bargaining being a sort of expansion of it; moreover, the Referendum forced the Constitutional Court to a defense, so strenuous as inconsistent, of art. 19, let. b, of the "Statuto dei lavoratori", extended to firm-level collective bargaining, and, what is more, destined not to survive to the crisis of Trade Union unity of the end of the first decade of this century. The unitary regulation introduced by the June 2011 Collective Agreement and by the May 2013 Protocol tried to launch a self-sufficient and omni-inclusive bargaining system, based on Unions which were representative at the sector-level for reaching the predetermined threshold of 5%, and on the "RSU" at firm-level. But, regardless of its state of implementation, it has internal inconsistencies, making it only partially suitable for attaining the objective pursued of an effective coverage of all workers at all level. Therefore, especially after the Constitutional Court ruling n. 231/2013, you just have to call upon a legislative intervention.
Keywords: Collective Labour Law; Constitution; Electoral Law; Contractual System; Concertazione; Representativeness.