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Empirical Research in Agricultural Contracts: Watch your Step
Titolo Rivista: RIVISTA DI ECONOMIA AGRARIA 
Autori/Curatori: Decio Zylbersztajn 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2013 Fascicolo: 3  Lingua: Italiano 
Numero pagine:  14 P. 27-40 Dimensione file:  50 KB
DOI:  10.3280/REA2013-003002
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più:  clicca qui   qui 


Il presente studio confronta l’evoluzione della teoria dell’organizzazione economica e la struttura dei contratti agricoli, sulla base di specifiche evidenze empiriche. In sostanza, se gli economisti dell’organizzazione si occupano dell’analisi del funzionamento del sistema economico, l’analisi sviluppata nel lavoro dimostra come l’uso di dati raccolti sui contratti agrari non fornisce informazioni sufficienti e pone attenzione solo ad alcuni aspetti della struttura degli incentivi presenti nella maggior parte degli accordi istituzionali. L’assunto è che se si utilizzano dati basati su collezioni contrattuali esistenti, non considerando le dimensioni delle transazioni regolate con altre tipologie di contratti formali, o non considerando aspetti relazionali e di apprendimento dinamici incorporati nella relazione contrattuale, i risultati possono portare a false conclusioni.


Keywords: Agricultural contracts, collecting agricultural information, informal transaction mechanisms
Jel Code: Q10, L1, L14

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Decio Zylbersztajn, in "RIVISTA DI ECONOMIA AGRARIA" 3/2013, pp. 27-40, DOI:10.3280/REA2013-003002

   

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