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Il pensiero meta-rappresentativo degli studenti universitari italiani
Titolo Rivista: RICERCHE DI PSICOLOGIA  
Autori/Curatori: Davide Massaro, Alessandro Antonietti, Antonella Marchetti, Federica Giudici 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2016 Fascicolo: 2  Lingua: Italiano 
Numero pagine:  19 P. 131-149 Dimensione file:  223 KB
DOI:  10.3280/RIP2016-002001
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Il crescente interesse per la Teoria della Mente in età adulta ha evidenziato come questa competenza, a differenza di quanto inizialmente ipotizzato, continui a evolvere nel corso della vita. Il presente lavoro esplora se la qualità della prestazione a compiti mentalistici da parte di giovani adulti possa dipendere anche dalla natura strutturale delle prove somministrate, nonché dal maggiore o minore coinvolgimento di abilità cognitive di base attivate dalle prove stesse (memoria, funzione esecutiva e complementazione linguistica). La capacità mentalistica in soggetti adulti è stata investigata utilizzando prove che, partendo dalla struttura classica della falsa credenza, se ne distanziano secondo una logica di progressiva e maggiore contestualizzazione. I risultati evidenziano come nelle prove classiche il ragionamento ricorsivo di secondo ordine venga impiegato più frequentemente rispetto a quello di terzo ordine; questo andamento si inverte nella prove più contestualizzate. Questi risultati vengono discussi alla luce del concetto di framing.


Keywords: Teoria della Mente, universitari, framing.

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Davide Massaro, Alessandro Antonietti, Antonella Marchetti, Federica Giudici, in "RICERCHE DI PSICOLOGIA " 2/2016, pp. 131-149, DOI:10.3280/RIP2016-002001

   

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