The paper aims at indicating the relevance of the issue of normativity for the construction of a "new" philosophical anthropology focused on the pragmatic criteria embedded with classical pragmatism, late Wittgenstein’s philosophy, and neo-pragmatism alike. In particular, their common project of putting aside the traditional foundationalism will be considered in order to checking whether and how is it possible to picture an image of the human being that eludes the narrow path of traditional metaphysics without however falling prey of a theoretical outlook fostering epistemic and ethical skepticism. Accordingly, the paper concentrates on R. Rorty’s "linguistic pragmatism" since it allows to tackle some pivotal questions about the philosophical-anthropological pragmatist and Wittgenstein’s orientation. In particular, the following two intertwined questions will be addressed: (1) what is the anthropologically relevant point in Rorty’s attempt to shift the very focus of pragmatist philosophy from the concept of experience to that of language? (2) Which kind of anthropological contribution should we grant to his defense of contingentism as against transcendentalism/metaphysics, and specifically to the theme of the change in vocabularies?
Keywords: Normativity, Pragmatic antropology, Rorty, Wittgenstein, Contingentism.