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Environmental Protection in Italian regions: North-Centre vs. South?
Journal Title: RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA SOSTENIBILITA' 
Author/s: Marcella D’Uva 
Year:  2018 Issue: Language: English 
Pages:  10 Pg. 25-34 FullText PDF:  172 KB
DOI:  10.3280/RISS2018-001004
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In this paper an econometric analysis of determinants of Italian regional public environmental expenditure is performed. Results from the whole sample show the presence of industrial pressure for environmental services, and that richer regions increase local environmental expenditure. When only North-Central regions are considered, econometric estimation evidences an interest of public opinion for environmental policies, and a positive relationship between per capita income and environmental expenditure. Pressure from population and industrial employees for the supply of environmental services is, also, found. In richer industries, the supply of regional environmental services is lower. In the Southern regions, only the aim of the local administration to maintain social stability is evident.
Keywords: Environmental expenditure, regional public spending determinants, local policies, population pressure, industrial pressure, regional differences.

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Marcella D’Uva, in "RIVISTA DI STUDI SULLA SOSTENIBILITA'" 1/2018, pp. 25-34, DOI:10.3280/RISS2018-001004

   

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