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Reputation in public procurement: A socially desirable mechanism to solve the problem of unverifiable quality
Journal Title: ECONOMIA PUBBLICA  
Author/s: Guido Tatone 
Year:  2018 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  27 Pg. 59-85 FullText PDF:  266 KB
DOI:  10.3280/EP2018-001003
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Keywords: Reputation, public procurement, auction theory, unverifiable quality
Jel Code: D82, H57, L14

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Guido Tatone, Reputation in public procurement: A socially desirable mechanism to solve the problem of unverifiable quality in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 1/2018, pp. 59-85, DOI:10.3280/EP2018-001003

   

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