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Signing the letter to shareholders: Does the Signatory’s role relate to impression management?
Titolo Rivista: FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Autori/Curatori: Saverio Bozzolan, Giovanna Michelon, Marco Mattei, Andrea Giornetti 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2019 Fascicolo: Lingua: Inglese 
Numero pagine:  46 P. 37-82 Dimensione file:  459 KB
DOI:  10.3280/FR2019-001002
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più:  clicca qui   qui 


In this paper, we study whether and how impression management in the letter to shareholders (LTS) is affected and related to the role of signatory (i.e. the person whose signature appears in the letter). Specifically, we argue and expect that impression management is associated with the underlying incentives to mislead outsiders that stem from the role of signatory. We find that impression management is more present when Insiders (executives or major shareholders) sign. We also find that the highest level of impression management is when the signatory holds an executive position and is not a major shareholder. Our evidence also suggests that the dichotomous classification between Insiders and Independent Directors is not sufficient to explain cross-sectional variation in impression management.


Jel Code: G39, M41

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Saverio Bozzolan, Giovanna Michelon, Marco Mattei, Andrea Giornetti, in "FINANCIAL REPORTING" 1/2019, pp. 37-82, DOI:10.3280/FR2019-001002

   

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