TY -  JOUR
PY -  2013
SN -  1972-4918
T1 -  Una nota su incentivi manageriali e altruismo in oligopolio
JO -  STUDI ECONOMICI 
DA -  10/15/2014 12:00:00 AM
DO -  10.3280/STE2013-110006
UR -  http://www.francoangeli.it/Riviste/Scheda_rivista.aspx?idArticolo=52237
AU -  Martina, Riccardo
SP -  105
EP -  114
IS -  110
VL -  LXVIII
LA -  IT
AB -  This note explores the impact of reciprocal altruism on the equilibrium outcome of a two-stage oligopoly game with managerial frms. The structure of the classical two-stage oligopoly game with managerial incentives with strategic substitutes (quantity competition) generates a typical "distortion" at equilibrium where quantities turn out to be larger than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ones. This paper shows that when firm owners’ objective functions are defined according to a reciprocal altruism hypothesis, the Cournot outcome of the static game can be achieved despite the two stage structure of the model. This result holds true when the analysis is extended to an N symmetric firms context.
PB -  FrancoAngeli
ER -