Quine e Tarski sul nominalismo - Quine and Tarski were kindred philosophical spirits. They rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction and shared a strong distaste for modal notions. Moreover, they both had nominalistic leanings. In this article I trace the nominalistic engagement of these two giants of contemporary analytic philosophy. Using recently discovered material from the Quine archive at Harvard, I begin by describing Quine’s engagement with nominalism up to 1940. I then summarize the impact of the 1940-1941 discussions on nominalism between Carnap, Quine and Tarski and mention their influence on Goodman. The third part of the article deals with Quine’s allegiance to nominalism and his subsequent reluctant acceptance of Platonism. The fourth part focuses on Tarski’s defence of nominalism in Amersfoort in 1953. In the conclusion, Quine’s and Tarski’s approaches to nominalism are compared with some contemporary nominalistic programs (Field, Hellman, etc.).