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Corporate governance e sistema fiscale: discriminazione tra azionisti
Titolo Rivista: STUDI ECONOMICI  
Autori/Curatori: Angelo Castaldo, Gianpaolo Crudo 
Anno di pubblicazione:  2009 Fascicolo: 98 Lingua: Italiano 
Numero pagine:  35 P. 23-57 Dimensione file:  808 KB
DOI:  10.3280/STE2009-098002
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Corporate Governance and Tax System: Interest Divergence between Insider-Outsider and Risk - This paper studies the interest diversion that arises, between insider and outsider in the corporation governance, when taking into account the effects determined by tax system. Very similar statutory tax rates, in presence of investment risk, reinforce the positional advantage of insider with respect to outsider. The interaction between corporate governance and tax system has been underestimated by neoclassical economic approach, and recently studied by law and economics’ scholars. On the basis of King and Fullerton’s (1984) model, we have developed a microsimulation model, considering specifically Italian tax system regime. We have then calculated effective marginal tax rates (EMTR) both in presence and in absence of risk. The main results show that at the increase of risk, effective marginal tax rates also decrease, but the reduction is more consistent for insiders. As a result, tax discrimination that arises on shareholders further amplifies the divergence of interest between insider and outsider.
Jel Code: H20, H21, H24, H25, H32, G30, G32



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Angelo Castaldo, Gianpaolo Crudo, in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 98/2009, pp. 23-57, DOI:10.3280/STE2009-098002

   

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