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Una nota su incentivi manageriali e altruismo in oligopolio
Journal Title: STUDI ECONOMICI  
Author/s: Riccardo Martina 
Year:  2013 Issue: 110 Language: Italian 
Pages:  10 Pg. 105-114 FullText PDF:  75 KB
DOI:  10.3280/STE2013-110006
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This note explores the impact of reciprocal altruism on the equilibrium outcome of a two-stage oligopoly game with managerial frms. The structure of the classical two-stage oligopoly game with managerial incentives with strategic substitutes (quantity competition) generates a typical "distortion" at equilibrium where quantities turn out to be larger than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ones. This paper shows that when firm owners’ objective functions are defined according to a reciprocal altruism hypothesis, the Cournot outcome of the static game can be achieved despite the two stage structure of the model. This result holds true when the analysis is extended to an N symmetric firms context.
Keywords: Oligopoly, Altruism, Incentives, Managerial Firms, Multi-Stage Games, Delegation.
Jel Code: L13, L20.

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Riccardo Martina, in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 110/2013, pp. 105-114, DOI:10.3280/STE2013-110006


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