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How changes the European economic constitution between risk sharing and moral hazard
Journal Title: DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE 
Author/s: Giovanni Pitruzzella 
Year:  2018 Issue: Language: Italian 
Pages:  12 Pg. 31-42 FullText PDF:  195 KB
DOI:  10.3280/DC2018-002003
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The essay examines some recent proposals for reform of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), underlining the main features of the ongoing development and its crucial issues. In particular, it is investigated how the overcoming of the Maastricht model of State Members’ financing and the growing intervention of EU in their economic policies determine a gap between decision makers and cost-bearers, with complex issues arises both on economical (i.e. moral hazard) and constitutional ground. Furthermore, it is outlined the position of Italy, which seems to require an efficient European ‘security net’ in order to face the risks connected to its chronic weakness in public finance and its low growth.
Keywords: Condivisione dei rischi; riforma EMU; moral hazard; decision makers; cost-bearers.

Giovanni Pitruzzella, How changes the European economic constitution between risk sharing and moral hazard in "DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE" 2/2018, pp. 31-42, DOI:10.3280/DC2018-002003

   

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