The contribution investigates the theoretical and historical fundamentals of the independence of central banks, examining the different experiences of North-America and Europe. After reconstructing the historical process that had led to theorization of the independence of the European central banks, the Author argues that this independent position, even if it is shaped on the basis of the Federal Reserve Bank model, pursues nevertheless the maintenance of price stability, in accordance with the German Bundesbank paradigm. This theory, which has been justified by the principles of ordoliberalism, appears to be beneficial for the German economic interests, but grossly inadequate to ensure stability and wealth to Eurozone.
Keywords: Banche centrali; indipendenza; stabilità dei prezzi; ordoliberalismo; Bundesbank; central banks; independence; price stability; ordoliberalism
Giulio Sapelli, Independence of central banks: a trick of mirrors? in "DIRITTO COSTITUZIONALE" 2/2018, pp. 59-83, DOI:10.3280/DC2018-002005