Teorie sull’eziologia degli incidenti nelle organizzazioni

Titolo Rivista SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO
Autori/Curatori Maurizio Catino, Dolino Alessia Bianco
Anno di pubblicazione 2013 Fascicolo 2013/130
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 19 P. 33-51 Dimensione file 639 KB
DOI 10.3280/SL2013-130003
Il DOI è il codice a barre della proprietà intellettuale: per saperne di più clicca qui

Qui sotto puoi vedere in anteprima la prima pagina di questo articolo.

Se questo articolo ti interessa, lo puoi acquistare (e scaricare in formato pdf) seguendo le facili indicazioni per acquistare il download credit. Acquista Download Credits per scaricare questo Articolo in formato PDF

Anteprima articolo

FrancoAngeli è membro della Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA)associazione indipendente e non profit per facilitare (attraverso i servizi tecnologici implementati da CrossRef.org) l’accesso degli studiosi ai contenuti digitali nelle pubblicazioni professionali e scientifiche

Questo articolo presenta i diversi contributi teorici che hanno caratterizzato l’eziologia degli incidenti organizzativi: (1) la teoria degli incidenti normali, causati dalle caratteristiche strutturali di alcune organizzazioni; (2) la teoria degli incidenti organizzativi, causati dalla presenza di fattori patogeni di natura organizzativa che favoriscono gli errori e le azioni insicure degli operatori; (3) la teoria degli incidenti epistemici, causati da assunzioni scientifiche e tecnologiche dimostratesi errate, anche se ritenute ragionevoli fino al manifestarsi dell’incidente. Dopo aver presentato le caratteristiche principali delle diverse teorie, l’articolo propone una comparazione analitica tra i diversi approcci individuandone le relative implicazioni per la teoria e per la pratica. In conclusione viene presentato un modello analitico multilivello (micro, meso, macro) per lo studio degli incidenti organizzativi e il miglioramento delle condizioni di sicurezza.;

Keywords:Incidente organizzativo, incidente normale, incidente epistemico, errore umano, sicurezza, affidabilità organizzativa

  1. Baldissera A. (1998), Incidenti tecnologici: fasi e sequenze causali. In Ceri P., Borgna P., a cura di, La tecnologia per il XXI secolo. Prospettive di sviluppo e rischi di esclusione. Torino: Einaudi.
  2. Boudon R. (1977), Effets pervers et ordre social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
  3. Boudon R. (1992), Traité de sociologie. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
  4. Catino M. (2006), Da Chernobyl a Linate. Incidenti tecnologici o errori organizzativi? Milano: Mondadori.
  5. Catino M. (2008), A Review of Literature: Individual Blame vs. Organizational Function Logic in Accident Analysis. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management, 16: 53-62.
  6. Catino M. (2010), A multilevel model of accident analysis: The Linate disaster. In: Alvintzi P., Eder H., eds, Crisis Management. New York: Nova Science Publishers.
  7. Catino M. (2013), Organizational Myopia: Problems of Rationality and Foresight in Organizations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  8. Collins H. (1992), Changing Order: Replication and Induction in Scientific Practice. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
  9. Downer J. (2011), “737-Cabriolet”: The Limits of Knowledge and the Sociology of Inevitable Failure. American Journal of Sociology, 117(3): 725-762, DOI: 10.1086/662383
  10. Durkheim E. (1895), Les règles de la méthode sociologique. Paris: Alcan.
  11. Goh Y.M., Love P.E.D., Brown H., Spickett J. (2012), Organizational Accidents: A Systemic Model of Production versus Protection. Journal of Management Studies, 49(1): 52-76, DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6486.2010.00959.x
  12. Hall J.L. (2003), Columbia and Challenger: organizational failure at NASA. Space Policy, 19: 239-247, DOI: 10.1016/j.spacepol.2003.08.013
  13. Hayek F.A. (1952), The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason. Glencoe Illinois: The Free Press.
  14. Hollnagel E. (2004), Barriers and Accident Prevention. Surrey UK: Ashgate.
  15. Hollnagel E., Woods D.E., Leveson N., eds (2006), Resilience Engineering. Concepts and Precepts. Burlington USA: Ashgate.
  16. Hopkins A. (1999), Managing Mayor Hazards – The Lesson of the Moura Mine Disaster. Nest: Allen & Unwin.
  17. Hutter B., Power M., eds (2005), Organizational Encounters with Risk. New York: Cambridge University Press, DOI: 10.1017/CBO9780511488580
  18. Hynes T., Prasad P. (1997), Patterns of “mock bureaucracy” in mining disasters: an analysis of the Westray coal mine explosion. Journal of Management Studies, 34: 601-623, DOI: 10.1111/1467-6486.00065
  19. LaPorte T., Consolini P. (1994), Working in Practice but not in Theory: Theoretical Challenges of High Reliability Organizations. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 1: 19-47.
  20. Leveson N. (2004), A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems. Safety Science, 42: 237-270.
  21. Magnus R., Teh C., Lau J.M. (2005), Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Incident at the MRT Circle Line Worksite that Led to the Collapse of the Nicoll Highway on 20 April 2004. Singapore: Subordinate Courts.
  22. March J.M. (1994), A Primer on Decision Making. How Decisions Happen. New York: The Free Press.
  23. Merton R.K. (1936), The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action. American Sociological Review, 1: 894-904.
  24. Merton R.K. (1940), Bureaucratic Structure and Personality. Social Forces, 17: 560-68.
  25. Merton R.K. (1968), Social Structure and Social Theory. New York: Free Press.
  26. Perrow C. (1984), Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.
  27. Perrow C. (1999), Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New York: Basic Books.
  28. Perrow C. (2004), A Personal Note on Normal Accidents. Organization & Environment, 1(1): 9-14, DOI: 10.1177/1086026603262028
  29. Perrow C. (2010), The meltdown was not an accident. In: Lounsbury M. and Hirsch P.M., eds, Markets on Trial: The Economic Sociology of the U.S. Financial Crisis: Part A (Research in the Sociology of Organizations Vol 30). UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, DOI: 10.1108/S0733-558X(2010)000030A014
  30. Rasmussen J. (1997), Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: a Modelling Problem. Safety Science, 2/3: 183-213, DOI: 10.1016/S0925-7535(97)00052-0.ReasonJ.(1990),HumanError.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress
  31. Reason J. (1997), Managing the Risk of Organizational Accidents. Surrey UK: Ashgate.
  32. Reason J. (2008), The Human Contribution: Unsafe Acts, Accidents and Heroic Recoveries. Surrey UK: Ashgate.
  33. Roberts K.H. (1990), Some Characteristics of One Type of High Reliability Organizations. Organization Science, 1: 160-177.
  34. Roberts K.H. (1993), New Challenges to Understanding Organizations. New York: Macmillan.
  35. Roe E., Schulman P.R. (2008), High Reliability Management: Operating on the Edge. Stanford CA: Stanford University Press.
  36. Simon H. (1947), Administrative Behaviour. New York: MacMillan.
  37. Simon H. (1955), A Behavioural Model of Rational Choice. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 69: 99-118, DOI: 10.2307/1884852
  38. Simon H. (1956), Rational Choice and The Structure of the Environment. Psychological Review, 63: 129-138, DOI: 10.1037/h0042769
  39. Snook S.A. (2000), Friendly Fire. The Accidental Shootdown of U.S. Black Hawks Over Northern of Iraq. Princeton New York: Princeton University Press.
  40. Turner B.A. (1976), The Organizational and Interorganizational Development of Disasters. Administrative Science Quarterly, 21: 378-97.
  41. Turner B.A. (1978), Man-Made Disasters. London: Wykeham.
  42. Turner B.A., Pidgeon N. (1997), Man-Made Disasters. Oxford: Butterworth Heinemmann.
  43. Vaughan D. (1990), Autonomy, Interdependence and Social Control: NASA and the Space Shuttle Challenger. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 225-258, DOI: 10.2307/2393390
  44. Vaughan D. (1996), The Challenger Launch Decision. Risk Technology, Culture, and Deviance at NASA. Chicago: The University Chicago Press.
  45. Vaughan D. (1999), The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake, Misconduct, and Disaster. American Review of Sociology, 25: 271-305, DOI: 10.1146/annurev.soc.25.1.271
  46. Weick K.E. (1987), Organizational Culture as a Source of High Reliability. California Management Review, 29: 112-27.
  47. Weick K.E., Sutcliffe K.M. (2007), Managing the Unexpected. Assuring High Performance in an Age of Complexity. San Francisco CA: Jossey-Bass.
  48. Woods D.D., Cook. R. (2002), Nine Steps to Move Forward from Error. Cognition, Technology and Work, 4(2): 137-144, DOI: 10.1007/s101110200012
  49. Woods D.D., Dekker S., Cook R., Johannesen L., Sarter N. (2010), Behind Human Error. Surrey UK: Ashgate.

Maurizio Catino, Dolino Alessia Bianco, Teorie sull’eziologia degli incidenti nelle organizzazioni in "SOCIOLOGIA DEL LAVORO " 130/2013, pp 33-51, DOI: 10.3280/SL2013-130003