RISULTATI RICERCA

L’Autore riconsidera le perversioni e le teorie psicoanalitiche classiche sulle perversioni da un punto di vista nuovo, proponendo quindi anche un criterio originale per determinarle. Egli non considera le perversioni come comportamenti sessuali specifici ma nemmeno come un tipo di fantasie: per lui la perversione è soprattutto una malattia etica. È perversa ogni relazione sessuale in cui la soggettività dell’altro viene usata come strumento per il piacere dell’Ego. Non si tratta quindi di una mancanza morale, ma di una strategia che trasforma una sofferenza (specialmente la gelosia) in un godimento manovrando l’altro come soggetto: il capolavoro perverso consiste nel trasformare il trauma della propria esclusione dal piacere dell’altro in un modo esclusivo di godere sessualmente. In questa prospettiva l’Autore ricostruisce la fenomenologia etica e soggettiva del voyeurismo e dell’esibizionismo, del sadismo e del masochismo, del feticismo, dei perversi omosessuali e delle donne perverse.

Nel corso di una serie di interviste a Helene Deutsch, l’autore ha intuito che una delle pazienti che Freud aveva inviato alla Deutsch negli anni ’20 era la stessa persona di cui lo stesso Freud aveva già parlato in un resoconto clinico da lui pubblicato sia nel cosiddetto «saggio segreto», Psicoanalisi e telepatia, sia, qualche anno più tardi, in Introduzione alla psicoanalisi (nuova serie di lezioni). L’autore sottolinea la serie di correzioni apportate da Freud al materiale pubblicato, e riesce in questa operazione sfruttando le notizie di prima mano fornitegli dalla Deutsch quarant’anni più tardi. Con un’impresa di questo tipo, l’autore spera di essere in grado di portare contemporaneamente un contributo alla storia della psicoanalisi ma anche a quella ricchissima esperienza che è la trasmissione della storia orale.

The research aims at evaluating the relationship between different regional policies and the cross-regional variability in the public per capitapharmaceutical expenditure. This relationship was matched with the effects of other variables, that affect the demand for and the supply of drugs but are not (or are only partially) influenced by regional actions (including population age structure and socio-economic conditions, morbidity, hospitalisation rates, pressure of pharmaceutical companies’ reps, GP and pharmacy density). The study is based on a qualitative and a quantitative approach. Regional policies on pharmaceuticals have been surveyed through a qualitative checklist. The explicative variables of the cross-regional variability in the pharmaceutical expenditure has been investigated through a multiple regression model. Cross-regional variability in the pharmaceutical expenditure proved to be explained related with differences among regional policies and partly with other variables This result may prove that (i) on the one side, regional policies may contribute to cost-containment; (ii) on the other side, cross-regional variability does not depend only on regional and local policies (and the effects of these policies on the appropriateness of demand for and prescriptions of drugs); (iii) should regions present the same (high) level of maturity as far as pharmaceutical policy is concerned, the cross-regional variability in the pharmaceutical expenditure would still remain rather high.

Did the judicial operation of Mani puliteaffect local policy decisions? The aim of this study is to provide an answer to this question. We describe the relationship between voters and elected representatives in a simple principal-agent setting. We use this framework to develop a theory analysing the impact produced by tighter judicial controls on this agency relationship. Our theoretical model allows us to formulate some hypotheses on the possible policy consequences associated to the judicial interventions in the Tangentopoliyears. Our theoretical hypotheses are then tested empirically. The results of the empirical investigation tell us that higher monitoring in the form of tighter judicial controls crowded-out public investment spending at local level. This effect, however, was not uniformly distributed across Italian regions.

The paper analyses the administrative corruption in a bureaucracy whose officials have overlapping jurisdictions (competitive bureaucracy). Analysis has been performed through models of demand and supply of the services provided by officials accepting bribes. Diffusion of corruption in the bureaucracy and possible equilibrium situations have been examined through models introducing several probability densities for the corruption costs of the individual bureaucrats.

The Italian government has recently proposed the introduction of the so called De-Tax (or A-Tax) as a tool to fund more enerously development and anti-poverty programs in poor countries. The basic idea is simple: if the seller of a given good or service decides to devote a fraction of her proceeds to some development, humanitarian purpose, he will be supported by the government through a reduction in indirect taxation (VAT). Basically, the De-Tax adds to the already existent incentives to «virtuous» behaviours, which operate through direct taxation, a further incentive operating through indirect taxation. In the paper we analyse some of the implications associated to this new mechanism, and we try to understand whether the De-Tax could be thought of as a good substitute for the Tobin Tax, the other well-known proposal on the policy arena. It will be elucidated that the idea of the De-Tax has both advantages and disadvantages compared to the current situation. On the one hand, being a mechanism based on indirect taxation, it introduces some more distorsions in the process of resources’ allocation; on the other, it is likely to make generous behaviours a bit less costly, to make the transaction costs associated to ethical behaviours much lower than they are under the current fiscal regime. As to the comparison with the Tobin Tax, we will argue why it does not make a lot of sense. The De-Tax is intended to promote a virtuous behaviour, whereas the Tobin Tax is thought of as a way of discouraging a vicious behaviour; the De-Tax can be seen as a subsidy introduced to deal with a positive externality, whilst the Tobin Tax should be conceptualised as a tax to mitigate a (financial) market failure. In a well-designed fiscal system there may be some room for both these tools.