RISULTATI RICERCA

Socially responsible behaviour by businesses (RSI) must be assessed not only from an ethical point of view but also in economic terms taking into account the close relationship between the development of an area and environmental and social factors. RSI can be defined as a public good because of the external effects it produces, but as it is marked by problems of market failure, regulation is necessary. This regulation can be erga omnes and, in that case, a package of incentives and obligations designed to condition the reaction functions of actors. This needs to be accompanied by regulations aimed at disciplining the behaviour of businesses which provide public services. To this end, we must presuppose it essential that the public policy objectives (FOP) to be met through the provision of such services are well defined by a rigorous indication of the contents, hierarchy and balance of those objectives. Once this condition is met, the choice between the possible options (competition in and for the market and public provision), as well as the way to handle the transition to the liberalisation of the local utilities market, should all be determined on a case by case basis on the basis of the productive conditions of the market, the ways of providing the service, the degree of complexity of the regulations and the level of transition costs. In order that the choices are efficient, a correct division of institutional functions is necessary to remove perverse incentives to the improper use of their function by local authorities.

Riduzione della spesa per interessi (1996-2003). Chi ne ha beneficiato? Una rappresentanza grafica (di Nicoletta Emiliani, Francesca Gastaldi, Giuseppe Pisauro, Giancarlo Salvemini) - ABSTRACT: Since 1996, interest payments on Italy’s public debt have significantly reduced as a consequence of public budget recovery, decrease in international interest rates and lower public debt/GDP ratio. This reduction may be viewed as a fiscal dividend. How was it used? How did it modify the public account structure? Which expenditure and tax items benefited most from this reduction? Did it cause some income redistribution? Using data on General Government accounts, the paper first analyses the distribution of this fiscal dividend in terms of lower deficit, lower taxes and higher public expenditures (other than interest payments); to this regard, it also detects which expenditure areas have gained most for given levels of both deficit and taxes. Second, the paper investigates the distribution of expenses and revenues among the various levels of government (central, local and social security entities). Finally, the income redistribution caused by the direct taxes reduction is analysed, by using a microsimulation model and focusing on personal income tax changes between 1996 and 2003. The main results are: a) the decrease in interest payments and public sector deficit is almost one-to-one; b) there is no evidence that any particular expenditure item has been targeted by this fiscal dividend; c) the reduction in primary surplus is mainly coming from an increasing deterioration of both local governments and social security accounts; d) there is some evidence that the income tax reductions at central level have generated some positive effects on redistributional grounds, even though they are partially compensated by corresponding increases in local income taxes.

The practice of charging to users the full cost of highways and infrastructures is in contrast with the criterion of setting tariffs at social marginal costs, and tends over time to transform user charges in a hidden form of (regressive) taxation. Regulating natural monopolies like highways through a price cap is criticized, and reasons are given to prefer a public company to private investors, and unbundling to operating concessions. The experience of privatisation and regulation of the main Italian highways operator is analysed.