RISULTATI RICERCA

Leopardi and Distraction: a Pascalian Heritage? This article aims to pre-­ sent the phenomenon of distraction (or divertissement) by comparing the perspectives of two classics of thought: Pascal and Leopardi. What does it mean to be distracted? How can this be done? What relationship does distraction have with human nature and with the theoretical apparatus of the two thinkers considered? To answer these ques-­ tions, the author puts into dialogue Pascal and Leopardi and the most relevant contem-­ porary critical voices on the topic, highlighting similarities and disagreements between the two modern intellectuals and trying to seize their main elements of originality.

This paper examines an argument developed by Leibniz against physical atomism, which has been largely overlooked in the scholarship. As outlined in the Introduction, this specific argument is closely tied to Leibniz’s conception of infinity and, in particular, to his theory of the universal connection of all things. The central sections analyse its principal formulation in a challenging text from 1689, highlighting its connections to key aspects of Leibniz’s metaphysics, including his account of individuation and his theory of individual substances as “mirrors of the universe.” After addressing a potential objection to the argument, the conclusion shows how Leibniz’s reduction of physical atoms to fictions nonetheless allows for a partial and provisional rehabilitation of physical atoms.

In this paper, it will be examinated addresses the paradox of modes that exist although they do not exist, which has its central place in Baruch Spinoza’s Ethics II, p. 8. It will be argued that argues that there is no ambiguity of the proposition, even if it could sound undecidable from an historical-­philosophical point of view, due to the lack of an explicit theory of distinctions. Thus, the problem of non-­existent modes will be theoretically framed in relation to the eternal status of substance by showing that: 1) there is no contradiction in thinking something that does not exist;; 2) starting from the definition of God, all modes must necessarily give themselves and their non-­existence is implied in the definition of God itself;; 3) the problem under consideration concerns rather the constitutive allusiveness of every image regarding God’s eternal actuality and its infinite production.

Old and New Threads: The Functions of Fear in Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. The article aims to study the functions of fear in Niccolò Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy. More specifically, the article intends to accomplish three different but related goals. The first goal is to prove that Machiavelli weaves his thoughts on fear by tying new threads to old ones. He draws on some of the functions of fear emerging from The Prince as well as from the ante res perditas writings, thus showing intellectual consistency in this regard. The second goal is to point out that Machiavelli further develops those recurring functions. He applies them in new theoretical contexts, enriches them with circumstance-­based remarks, and connects them with other key psychological factors, such as love, hatred, and discontent. The third goal is to underscore that Machiavelli’s thoughts on fear in the Discourses constitute an articulated conceptual framework, which allows him to explain political dynamics, historical events, and their psychological underpinnings.

In his Lectura Secunda (d. 1, q. 6, §1), Adam Wodeham depicts a scenario in which God’s absolute power is uncommonly used to prove the inseparability of enjoyment (fruitio) and pleasure (delectatio) in the beatific vision. After putting Wodeham’s argument into its historical context, I argue that it can be considered an example of a thought experiment. If confirmed, this acknowledgment can lead to a major clarification in the current debate about Medieval thought experiments.