The directive on commercial practices: a missed opportunity to protect agriculture producers?

Journal title GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI
Author/s Antonio Iannarelli
Publishing Year 2019 Issue 2019/163 Language Italian
Pages 24 P. 439-462 File size 256 KB
DOI 10.3280/GDL2019-163001
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The essay analyzes critically the recent Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-cil on unfair trading practices in business-to-business relationships in the agricultural and food supply chain. The lack of distinction in the proposal between agricultural producers and any natural or legal person who sells agricultural and food products appears to be in contrast with the reference to Article 43 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union as the basis of the Directive. Furthermore, the provision of only specific hypotheses relating exclusively to situations of different annual turnover of suppliers and buyers does not provide adequate pro-tection against the structural weakness of the farmers who are still price takers. The same criti-cal consideration is put forward with regard to the contractual clauses which are prohibited, unless they have been previously agreed in clear and unambiguous terms in the supply agree-ment or in a subsequent agreement between the supplier and the buyer.

Keywords: Food and agricultural supply chain; Agricultural producers and simple suppliers of agricultural and food products; Unfair commercial practices.

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  • Pratiche sleali, equilibrio del valore e legalità dei rapporti di lavoro nella filiera agroalimentare Irene Canfora, Vito Leccese, in GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI 173/2022 pp.135
    DOI: 10.3280/GDL2022-173006

Antonio Iannarelli, La direttiva sulle pratiche commerciali: un’occasione persa per la tutela dei produttori agricoli? in "GIORNALE DI DIRITTO DEL LAVORO E DI RELAZIONI INDUSTRIALI " 163/2019, pp 439-462, DOI: 10.3280/GDL2019-163001