Kuhn, Normativiy and History and Philosophy of Science

The paper addresses the relation between the history and philosophy of science by way of the issue of epistemic normativity. Historical evidence of change of scientific method may seem to support epistemic relativism. But this does not entail that epistemic justification varies with methods employed by scientists. An argument is required that justification depends on such methods. Following discussion of Kuhn, the paper considers treatment of epistemic normativity by Lakatos, Laudan and Worrall. Lakatos and Laudan propose that the history of science may adjudicate between theories of method. Historical episodes are selected on the basis of value judgements or pre-analytic intuitions, which are themselves problematic. Laudan proposed the naturalist view that a rule of method be evaluated empirically on the basis of reliability in conducing to cognitive aims. Against this, Worrall argued that the normative force of appeal to past reliability requires an a priori inductive principle. In my view, the problem of normativity is solved by combining a particularist focus on specific episodes in the history of science with a naturalistic account of the reliability of method.

Keywords: Kuhn, Lakatos, normativity, history and philosophy of science.

• How the epistemic relativist may use the sceptic’s strategy: A reply to Markus Seidel Howard Sankey, in Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A /2013 pp.140
  DOI: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2012.10.003

Howard Sankey, Kuhn, Normativiy and History and Philosophy of Science in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2012, pp 103-111, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2012-001008