Forme di pagamento, regole di responsabilità e comportamento del produttore sanitario

Author/s Giuseppe Clerico
Publishing Year 2001 Issue 2001/3
Language Italian Pages 33 P. File size 155 KB
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In the health care sector the buyer aims to pursue two basic ends: to minimize the health outlay, for given levels of effectiveness; to offer a good quality of the service to the patient. Also in the health sector the Tinbergen’s intuition is valid: you need two means to pursue two ends. These are the two tools: the different contract types; and the liability rules to apply when the patient is dissatisfied. If the buyer can impose the patient’s cure to the supplier the fixed price complies with efficiency criterion. The supplier however ought to be relieved from every liability towards the patient. On the contrary, the buyer aiming to preserve the quality of service has to pay a share of the real costs to the supplier. In this case, a share of the liability should be ascribed to the supplier. We analyse both the different contract types and the different liability allotments referring to three cases: a) the buyer is able to impose both the type and the intensity of the cure; b) the buyer can impose type and intensity only partially; c) the buyer is unable to impose either type and intensity.

Giuseppe Clerico, Forme di pagamento, regole di responsabilità e comportamento del produttore sanitario in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 3/2001, pp , DOI: