Designing fees for music copyright holders in radio services

Author/s Roberto Bombana, Carla Marchese
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2014/2
Language English Pages 15 P. 5-19 File size 117 KB
DOI 10.3280/POLI2014-002001
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This paper investigates which is the most desirable payment schedule, from a social welfare standpoint, for compensating IPR holders for music broadcast by radio stations. A model of a radio station that acts as a monopoly with respect to listeners and sells ads in a competitive market is presented. Two types of fees, ad valorem and per unit, are examined. Exploiting the similarity between taxes and fees, we extend results from taxation theory in two-sided markets to show that the case where only one side (i.e. advertisers) pays, while the other (the listeners) receives the service for free, differs somewhat from the case thus far considered by the literature, in which both sides pay. The results mildly support the prevailing regulatory approach, based on ad valorem fees.

Keywords: Regulation, radio, collecting agencies, IPR fees

Jel codes: H23, H44, L82

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Roberto Bombana, Carla Marchese, Designing fees for music copyright holders in radio services in "ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE " 2/2014, pp 5-19, DOI: 10.3280/POLI2014-002001