Una casa di 3 piani + 1. Il sogno di Jung e le omologie archetipiche cervello-mente in una prospettiva evolutiva

Titolo Rivista STUDI JUNGHIANI
Autori/Curatori Stefano Mariano Carta, Antonio Alcaro
Anno di pubblicazione 2022 Fascicolo 2022/55
Lingua Italiano Numero pagine 26 P. 54-79 Dimensione file 0 KB
DOI 10.3280/jun55-2022oa14057
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Sulla nave che lo portava verso le Clark lectures negli Stati Uniti, Jung racconta a Freud un sogno, divenuto famoso, in cui una casa a quattro piani, o livelli, sembra rappresentare la struttura di una psiche fondata sull’inconscio archetipico. Nonostante l’idea di archetipo sia stata più volte oggetto di critiche, a partire dalla seconda metà del 1900 gli studi scientifici sull’organizzazione del cervello umano hanno confermato l’ipotesi di una stratificazione delle funzioni mentali e di una determinazione prevalentemente istintuale ed ereditaria del primo e più antico strato dell’evoluzione neuropsichica. Pertanto, riprendendo la struttura della casa sognata da Jung, in questo articolo proponiamo l’idea di una stratificazione psico-neuro-archeologica suddivisa in 3+1 strati sovrapposti che costituisce una elaborazione del modello neuro-archeologico ternario elaborato da Paul MacLean prima e da Jaak Panksepp poi, in cui l’affettività rappresenta il fattore organizzativo fondamentale del cervello-mente. Lo strato più evoluto, caratteristico della specie umana, è quello dell’auto-coscienza riflessiva. Subito sotto si trova il livello della coscienza intersoggettiva, caratteristico delle specie omeoterme (mammiferi ed uccelli) e legato all’evoluzione di un complesso di strutture corticali mediali chiamate Default-Mode-Network. Ancora sotto si trova lo strato della coscienza cognitivo-immaginativa, evolutasi nei vertebrati dotati di corteccia cerebrale. Infine, il primo e più antico strato, è quello della consapevolezza affettiva, legato al funzionamento delle strutture sottocorticali mediali (core-Self), dove risiedono i circuiti istintuali ed archetipici individuati negli studi neuro-etologici di Panksepp.

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Stefano Mariano Carta, Antonio Alcaro, Una casa di 3 piani + 1. Il sogno di Jung e le omologie archetipiche cervello-mente in una prospettiva evolutiva in "STUDI JUNGHIANI" 55/2022, pp 54-79, DOI: 10.3280/jun55-2022oa14057