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Il tasso di irregolarità del lavoro nelle regioni italiane presenta caratteristiche di forte persistenza nel corso del tempo, nonostante i numerosi interventi legislativi che si sono succeduti nel tempo. L’obiettivo del lavoro è identificare quali sono le caratteristiche economico-sociali delle regioni in grado di spiegare il fenomeno dell’impiego di lavoro irregolare. Dopo avere analizzato la principale letteratura nazionale e internazionale sull’economia sommersa e il lavoro irregolare, sono state identificate le principali determinanti del fenomeno. I dati utilizzati sono quelli resi disponibili dall’ISTAT in serie storica. Dall’analisi esplorativa dei dati, appare che la specificazione preferibile del modello sia di tipo dinamico e cioè esso deve includere il tasso di irregolarità ritardato tra le covariate. Attraverso uno stimatore GMM di Arellano-Bond si è stimato il modello panel dinamico. L’analisi empirica conferma l’ipotesi che il modello è di tipo autoregressivo. In linea con quanto trovato da altri autori, risultano rilevanti anche il tasso di disoccupazione, la tax morale (colta attraverso il capitale sociale), il capitale umano e la capacità di innovare. L’evasione fiscale e contributiva è una delle principali piaghe dell’Italia che, in questo momento di crisi, è particolarmente difficile da tollerare. Ecco perché comprendere le ragioni che spiegano il lavoro irregolare è molto importante, soprattutto per i policy maker. Il presente articolo va in questa direzione, contribuendo a dare indicazioni su quali sono gli aspetti che, a livello regionale, vanno potenziati oppure ridotti al fine di contrastare il sommerso.

Questo lavoro studia i cambiamenti intervenuti nella composizione qualitativa dell’occupazione in Veneto attraverso l’analisi dei microdati lavoratore-impresa ottenuti collegando l’archivio dei bilanci delle imprese Cerved alla base dati amministrativa Planet 2.1 di Veneto Lavoro che registra l’universo delle transizioni dei lavoratori dipendenti nel mercato del lavoro regionale. L’analisi mostra come, anche durante la recente crisi, in un contesto generale di riduzione del valore aggiunto e dell’occupazione, sia proseguita la tendenza all’innalzamento delle qualifiche professionali e del grado d’istruzione degli occupati dipendenti. Tale risultato deriva sia da un effetto di selezione delle imprese, per cui quelle meno produttive, con la forza lavoro meno qualificata, sono più frequentemente uscite dal mercato, sia dal processo di ristrutturazione messo in atto dalle imprese più produttive che per mantenere la propria posizione competitiva hanno continuato a migliorare il livello medio di qualificazione e istruzione della forza lavoro.

Nonostante tutti i Paesi sviluppati, sospinti da motivazioni di carattere sociale o politico, facciano ricorso a politiche regionali, resta aperto il confronto sull’efficacia di tali interventi. Il presente lavoro illustra innanzitutto il dibattito internazionale, che vede oggi contrapporsi due visioni alternative che in breve possono riassumersi nel sostegno a politiche "cieche" rispetto alla dimensione spaziale o al contrario a politiche mirate sui luoghi. Successivamente, il lavoro descrive i principali fatti che contrassegnano la progettazione della futura politica di coesione in Europa e in Italia.

Meinong has become a central reference point in the contemporary revival of realism. However, prima facie, it might seem paradoxical to call him a realist since he explicitly wanted to do away with any kind of "bias in favor of reality". It is therefore worth asking in which sense the Theory of Object, as far as it resolutely goes beyond reality, can be characterized as essentially realist. As a Brentanist the Austrian philosopher endorsed a strong realism with regard to empirical reality; in his view, this is the proper object of metaphysics. However, it seems more difficult to make sense of his realism in respect of those objects that are not real - and, as a matter of fact, of every kind of object - which he calls ‘objectivism’. This paper investigates the real meaning of such ‘objectivism’ and sees in that stance, beyond its superficial (neo- )Kantian features, an anti-Copernican revolution in philosophy that proclaims the unconditional precedence of the object over thought. Reading Meinong thus helps us to understand better what realism is.

This essay deals with the legacy left by Wilhelm Dilthey to contemporary philosophy. In particular, what is highlighted is that the legacy of this philosopher transcends the influence he exerted on several authors since his legacy is, above all, an experience of the limits and the crisis of philosophical knowledge. Dilthey’s desire to depart from the traditional metaphysical horizon and propose a philosophy of life able to decode modern times, socially complex and devoid of ethical considerations, is specifically evident in his Leben Schleiermachers. Shifting the emphasis from the traditional Schleiermacher- Dilthey-Heidegger-Gadamer genealogy, this essay provides a more articulate horizon to the comparison between Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dilthey. In the light of this horizon, it can be understood why we cannot speak of a homogenous "Diltheyan school" as heir to the restless mind of the master.

Since to the essence of everything belongs, besides its internal constitution, also the relation with the external causes that keep that thing alive, the conatus has to be interpreted as the effort to keep and perfect the interaction of the thing with the outside world. The author tries to demonstrate his thesis by starting from a confutation of the "Inherence Implies Causation Doctrine" of Don Garrett, proceeding through an analytical comment on the propositions from E3p4 to E3p6, and pointing out the intrinsic relation - though not to be seen in the critical literature - of conatus and external causes. To end, the essay addresses the topic of fortune so as to make clear that the opposition of the conatus to the fortune does not mean opposition to the relations with the outside world. .

The outstanding mathematician Federigo Enriques (1871-1946) acted as scientific adviser to the publisher Zanichelli in Bologna, where he was professor of projective geometry at the University. This paper reconstructs his activities from 1894 to 1938, when he was forced to leave the publishing house due to the race laws. Enriques exerted a strong influence on the publisher in the choice of authors (from Castelnuovo to Amaldi and Fermi) and the structure of its book series; he also gave equal consideration to highly specialised texts and those by teachers at high school and university. Together with Eugenio Rignano, he founded the journal Scientia in the pursuit of a necessary synthesis of science, humanities and didactics, which was his hallmark both as a scholar and a chief editor. The development of Federigo Enriques’ deep editorial involvement is documented with reference to book series and titles, relations with authors and sales figures, ending with a look at percentages and ratios between students and teaching staff in Italian schools from unification onwards.

The intellectual work of Enriques was deeply connected with his philosophical thought. While it is clear that Enriques’ proposals in the early decades of the 1900s for a new school and university did not meet with success, his cultural legacy is still fully present today. Based on the analysis of some articles on teaching and some of his books written for high school, the author focuses his attention on the consequences of the Enriques’ educational thought in order to highlight its modernity and importance both in everyday practice in schools and in the history of mathematics. In this essay the author examines in particular the influence of Enriques in the fields of geometry, logic, number theory and history of mathematics.

In the aftermath of the IV International Congress of Philosophy, organized by Enriques at Bologna in April 1911, Croce harshly criticized the mathematician because of the overly scientific nature of the conference. He also attacked Enriques on a personal level, calling him the President of a "weakly composite and inert Italian Philosophical Society". The latter criticism, generally considered insignificant "because it is too personal and lacking in philosophical content", on the contrary deserves some attention: in fact it seems to refer to the intense activity of reforming Italian schools and universities to which Enriques had dedicated himself in the previous five years, in his role as President of the Italian Philosophical Society. The Author focuses both on Enriques’ lucid and thorough analysis of the problems that affected Italian universities in the early 20th century and on his original proposals for reform. These aspects underline the leading role played by the mathematician in the cultural and political debate of the time and explain the harsh tones in his dispute with Croce.

According to a common interpretation, Enriques’ efforts to make widespread a model of philosophy open to dialogue with science were hampered by Croce, who supported an obsolete form of humanism tending to deny the epistemological value of science and, as a consequence, to reject all collaboration or even any communication between science and philosophy. However, this reconstruction of the polemical argument between the two thinkers in the two-year period 1911-1912 is incorrect. This is because Croce’s doctrine of the economic-practical value of science was in line with the prevailing trends within the international epistemological debate at that time, trends that Croce knew very well and appreciated. He opposed Enriques’ project not out of an indiscriminate aversion to scientific culture, but due to the fact that, though mistakenly, he saw Enriques’ quite anti-conventionalist and anti-pragmatist realism as a recovery of the old form of positivism.

The article focuses on two major institutions founded by the same scholar, Federigo Enriques (1871-1946): the Italian Philosophical Society (1905- ) and the journal Scientia (1907-1988). Through a series of International Philosophical Congresses, starting in Paris in 1900, a network of philosophers, mathematicians and other scientists came into existence. The opening address given by Enriques to the fourth International Philosophical Congress, in Bologna in 1911, discussed ‘the problem of reality’, a theme particularly attractive to different philosophical traditions and schools, as well as to scientists from different areas. Two of the talks are considered here, one by Enriques himself and the other by Agostino Gemelli, future founder of the Catholic University in Milan. The aim of the article is to highlight the still persistent gap in Italy between the philosophical and scientific environments. While investigating the causes, the article also points to the importance of trying new ways to bridge this gap.

The Author examines Federigo Enriques’ stance towards both Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Enriques regards the use of non-Euclidean geometries as the true and only philosophical meaning in Einstein’s theory, a meaning which was not however unique to Einstein’s work, having already emerged some years before in the work of numerous scholars of non-Euclidean geometries. As to quantum mechanics, he wanted to delete indeterminism, that is what unequivocally lay outside his conception of science grounded in the principles of classical physics.