RISULTATI RICERCA

Meinong has become a central reference point in the contemporary revival of realism. However, prima facie, it might seem paradoxical to call him a realist since he explicitly wanted to do away with any kind of "bias in favor of reality". It is therefore worth asking in which sense the Theory of Object, as far as it resolutely goes beyond reality, can be characterized as essentially realist. As a Brentanist the Austrian philosopher endorsed a strong realism with regard to empirical reality; in his view, this is the proper object of metaphysics. However, it seems more difficult to make sense of his realism in respect of those objects that are not real - and, as a matter of fact, of every kind of object - which he calls ‘objectivism’. This paper investigates the real meaning of such ‘objectivism’ and sees in that stance, beyond its superficial (neo- )Kantian features, an anti-Copernican revolution in philosophy that proclaims the unconditional precedence of the object over thought. Reading Meinong thus helps us to understand better what realism is.

This essay deals with the legacy left by Wilhelm Dilthey to contemporary philosophy. In particular, what is highlighted is that the legacy of this philosopher transcends the influence he exerted on several authors since his legacy is, above all, an experience of the limits and the crisis of philosophical knowledge. Dilthey’s desire to depart from the traditional metaphysical horizon and propose a philosophy of life able to decode modern times, socially complex and devoid of ethical considerations, is specifically evident in his Leben Schleiermachers. Shifting the emphasis from the traditional Schleiermacher- Dilthey-Heidegger-Gadamer genealogy, this essay provides a more articulate horizon to the comparison between Friedrich Schleiermacher and Dilthey. In the light of this horizon, it can be understood why we cannot speak of a homogenous "Diltheyan school" as heir to the restless mind of the master.

Since to the essence of everything belongs, besides its internal constitution, also the relation with the external causes that keep that thing alive, the conatus has to be interpreted as the effort to keep and perfect the interaction of the thing with the outside world. The author tries to demonstrate his thesis by starting from a confutation of the "Inherence Implies Causation Doctrine" of Don Garrett, proceeding through an analytical comment on the propositions from E3p4 to E3p6, and pointing out the intrinsic relation - though not to be seen in the critical literature - of conatus and external causes. To end, the essay addresses the topic of fortune so as to make clear that the opposition of the conatus to the fortune does not mean opposition to the relations with the outside world. .

The outstanding mathematician Federigo Enriques (1871-1946) acted as scientific adviser to the publisher Zanichelli in Bologna, where he was professor of projective geometry at the University. This paper reconstructs his activities from 1894 to 1938, when he was forced to leave the publishing house due to the race laws. Enriques exerted a strong influence on the publisher in the choice of authors (from Castelnuovo to Amaldi and Fermi) and the structure of its book series; he also gave equal consideration to highly specialised texts and those by teachers at high school and university. Together with Eugenio Rignano, he founded the journal Scientia in the pursuit of a necessary synthesis of science, humanities and didactics, which was his hallmark both as a scholar and a chief editor. The development of Federigo Enriques’ deep editorial involvement is documented with reference to book series and titles, relations with authors and sales figures, ending with a look at percentages and ratios between students and teaching staff in Italian schools from unification onwards.

The intellectual work of Enriques was deeply connected with his philosophical thought. While it is clear that Enriques’ proposals in the early decades of the 1900s for a new school and university did not meet with success, his cultural legacy is still fully present today. Based on the analysis of some articles on teaching and some of his books written for high school, the author focuses his attention on the consequences of the Enriques’ educational thought in order to highlight its modernity and importance both in everyday practice in schools and in the history of mathematics. In this essay the author examines in particular the influence of Enriques in the fields of geometry, logic, number theory and history of mathematics.

In the aftermath of the IV International Congress of Philosophy, organized by Enriques at Bologna in April 1911, Croce harshly criticized the mathematician because of the overly scientific nature of the conference. He also attacked Enriques on a personal level, calling him the President of a "weakly composite and inert Italian Philosophical Society". The latter criticism, generally considered insignificant "because it is too personal and lacking in philosophical content", on the contrary deserves some attention: in fact it seems to refer to the intense activity of reforming Italian schools and universities to which Enriques had dedicated himself in the previous five years, in his role as President of the Italian Philosophical Society. The Author focuses both on Enriques’ lucid and thorough analysis of the problems that affected Italian universities in the early 20th century and on his original proposals for reform. These aspects underline the leading role played by the mathematician in the cultural and political debate of the time and explain the harsh tones in his dispute with Croce.

According to a common interpretation, Enriques’ efforts to make widespread a model of philosophy open to dialogue with science were hampered by Croce, who supported an obsolete form of humanism tending to deny the epistemological value of science and, as a consequence, to reject all collaboration or even any communication between science and philosophy. However, this reconstruction of the polemical argument between the two thinkers in the two-year period 1911-1912 is incorrect. This is because Croce’s doctrine of the economic-practical value of science was in line with the prevailing trends within the international epistemological debate at that time, trends that Croce knew very well and appreciated. He opposed Enriques’ project not out of an indiscriminate aversion to scientific culture, but due to the fact that, though mistakenly, he saw Enriques’ quite anti-conventionalist and anti-pragmatist realism as a recovery of the old form of positivism.

The article focuses on two major institutions founded by the same scholar, Federigo Enriques (1871-1946): the Italian Philosophical Society (1905- ) and the journal Scientia (1907-1988). Through a series of International Philosophical Congresses, starting in Paris in 1900, a network of philosophers, mathematicians and other scientists came into existence. The opening address given by Enriques to the fourth International Philosophical Congress, in Bologna in 1911, discussed ‘the problem of reality’, a theme particularly attractive to different philosophical traditions and schools, as well as to scientists from different areas. Two of the talks are considered here, one by Enriques himself and the other by Agostino Gemelli, future founder of the Catholic University in Milan. The aim of the article is to highlight the still persistent gap in Italy between the philosophical and scientific environments. While investigating the causes, the article also points to the importance of trying new ways to bridge this gap.

The Author examines Federigo Enriques’ stance towards both Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum mechanics. Enriques regards the use of non-Euclidean geometries as the true and only philosophical meaning in Einstein’s theory, a meaning which was not however unique to Einstein’s work, having already emerged some years before in the work of numerous scholars of non-Euclidean geometries. As to quantum mechanics, he wanted to delete indeterminism, that is what unequivocally lay outside his conception of science grounded in the principles of classical physics.

L’autrice è partita dal concetto di innato messo in luce nel numero tre di Ricerca Psicoanalitica sull’opera di Stern ed ha approfondito l’utilizzo del concetto all’interno della diatriba tra psicoanalisi e ricerca, mettendo in luce come e perché esso abbia trovato terreno fertile in ambito psicoanalitico. Ha evidenziato quanto Stern e l’infant research abbiano scosso nelle fondamenta le certezze psicoanalitiche con l’infant observation. Infine ha sottolineato che è in corso d’opera una metanoia, un cambiamento epistemico e metodologico che ci spinge a interrogarci sul senso e sull’utilizzo di ogni specifica disciplina per uscire da facili universalismi e per avere uno sguardo sempre più rivolto al particolare, al contestuale e al processuale che può aiutare a evitare facili individualismi.

L’autrice individua nella mancata inclusione da parte del Sé di una giovane donna, le ragioni della sua infertilità. Mediante il ripercorrimento di una vicissitudine esistenziale durata vent’anni, vengono messe a fuoco le tappe di riconoscimento ed inclusione da parte del Sé, di dimensioni dell’essere non approvate dalla madre, indispensabili al soggetto per raggiungere, contemporaneamente, autonomia e pienezza biologica. La vicenda clinica di seguito illustrata, si è rivelata evento comune all’interno di un gruppo sociale particolare, rappresentato da donne socialmente affermate in cui il mentale sembra avere preso il sopravvento sul biologico, per ragioni complesse, ascrivibili in parte alla cultura, cosiddetta femminista.

Nell’articolo l’autrice, psichiatra esperta nel lavoro clinico con gli adolescenti migranti e le loro famiglie, centra la sua attenzione sulle problematiche riguardanti il corpo delle ragazze migranti "di seconda generazione". Il corpo, importante elemento di comunicazione per gli adolescenti in generale, diventa per queste ragazze un luogo d’elezione per esprimere conflitti e sofferenze, rivelatori della rottura di senso che spesso si verifica in seguito all’evento traumatico della migrazione, vissuto dall’intera famiglia. Da qui tentativi di suicidio e patologie che si traducono direttamente sul corpo, come mutilazioni, cicatrici, marcature. Con uno sguardo allenato a una visione bifocale, che transita continuamente da una lettura psichiatrica e psicologica "occidentale" a una transculturale, attraverso il processo di consultazione praticato nelle strutture francesi da lei dirette, l’autrice illustra due casi di adolescenti figlie di genitori migranti, il cui cammino verso l’acquisizione della propria identità ha comportato traumi e sofferenze espressi principalmente attraverso il corpo.

Lo studio indaga la relazione tra la selezione e l’editing delle fotografie postate su Facebook e l’immagine corporea in adolescenza. A 588 ragazzi (M = 296 e F = 292) tra i 12 e i 19 anni (M = 15,8; DS = 1,9) sono stati somministrati il Pubertal Developmental Scale (Petersen et al.,1988), il Body Esteem Scale (Mendelson, Mendelson e White, 2001) e un questionario sull’editing fotografico costruito ad hoc. I dati rilevano, soprattutto per le ragazze, una correlazione inversa tra editing dell’immagine fotografica, stima del proprio corpo, età e percezione dello sviluppo puberale. Per tutti il disagio derivante dal vedere un proprio difetto fisico su Facebook è negativamente correlato con la stima del proprio corpo. I dati evidenziano che la selezione e l’editing delle foto postate su Facebook hanno, per le ragazze con una più bassa stima del corpo, lo scopo di mostrare una migliore immagine corporea. Lo studio suggerisce delle riflessioni sul ruolo dei social network nei processi di accettazione del nuovo corpo e di costruzione dell’identità in adolescenza.