The numbers don’t fit: a problem for reliabilism

Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2014/1 Language Italian
Pages 10 P. 96-105 File size 579 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2014-001006
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I numeri non quadrano: un problema per l’affidabilismo. Le lunghe sequenze di giustificazioni rappresentano un problema per l’affidabilismo. La teoria della giustificazione fornita dall’affidabilismo basato su processi affidabili consente d’estendere in modo poco plausibile il significato di "credenza giustificata". Secondo la teoria affidabilistica basata su processi affidabili, è possibile che un processo cognitivo di giustificazione abbia una probabilità arbitrariamente bassa di aver successo, mentre una credenza giustificata abbia una probabilità arbitrariamente bassa d’esser vera. Questo risultato víola sia gli scopi dell’affidabilismo sia i nostri standard ordinari di giustificazione.

Keywords: Giustificazione, affidabilismo, problema della concatenazione, probabilità.

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Jan-Hendrik Heinrichs, The numbers don’t fit: a problem for reliabilism in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2014, pp 96-105, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2014-001006