Disabilità e autonomia: i limiti dell’approccio relazionale

Journal title SALUTE E SOCIETÀ
Author/s Domenico Melidoro
Publishing Year 2025 Issue 2025/3
Language Italian Pages 14 P. 35-48 File size 310 KB
DOI 10.3280/SES2025-003003
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This article offers a critical examination of the concept of relational autonomy. After reconstructing its meaning and main premises – set in contrast to the dominant individualistic approach in ethical and political philosophy – the paper assesses whether this perspective succeeds in overcoming cognitive ableism. The effectiveness of the relational approach is analyzed within models of decision-making support and fiduciary care, highlighting, however, the persistence of ableist assumptions. It is argued that, despite its promise of greater inclusivity, relational autonomy continues to uphold autonomy—albeit redefined—as a central value. This reveals the need for a more radical questioning of its primacy in order to enable the genuine philosophical inclusion of disabled lives.

Keywords: relational autonomy; ableism; cognitive ableism; disability; inclusive design; inclusion.

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Domenico Melidoro, Disabilità e autonomia: i limiti dell’approccio relazionale in "SALUTE E SOCIETÀ" 3/2025, pp 35-48, DOI: 10.3280/SES2025-003003