Agency theory and work incentives

Author/s Maurizio Lisciandra
Publishing Year 2008 Issue 2007/91 Language English
Pages 30 P. 117-146 File size 340 KB
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<em>Agency Theory and Work Incentives</em> (by Maurizio Lisciandra) - ABSTRACT: This paper is an extensive review of agency theory applied to labour incentives. It introduces a generalised principal-agent model that goes through a certain degree of critical assessment. The analysis of the optimality within the trade-off of insurance against incentives is enriched by bringing in the contribution of established extensions and new approaches to the agency theory and, to a larger extent, labour incentives. Keywords: Agency Theory, Incentives, Labour Contracts

Maurizio Lisciandra, Agency theory and work incentives in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 91/2007, pp 117-146, DOI: