Simpatia e «punti di vista fermi e generali». David Hume contro il sentimentalismo ingenuo
Journal title SOCIETÀ DEGLI INDIVIDUI (LA)
Author/s Sarah Songhorian
Publishing Year 2022 Issue 2022/73 Language Italian
Pages 12 P. 125-136 File size 83 KB
DOI 10.3280/LAS2022-073010
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The aim of this paper is to show how David Hume’s ethics, far from being a naïve sentimentalism, accounts better that its contemporary resumptions for the need to ground morality not on our immediate emotional reactions, but rather on sympathy cor¬rected assuming a general point of view. Similarly, Adam Smith’s ethics moves from the sa¬me premises and the same needs, although he achieves a deepened account of the impartial standpoint needed to account for moral judgment. Understanding their proposals is not only relevant exegetically, but also because it might point at the elements in their theories that are worth considering in contemporary debates.
Keywords: Sympathy, David Hume, Adam Smith, impartial spectator, sentimentalism
Sarah Songhorian, Simpatia e «punti di vista fermi e generali». David Hume contro il sentimentalismo ingenuo in "SOCIETÀ DEGLI INDIVIDUI (LA)" 73/2022, pp 125-136, DOI: 10.3280/LAS2022-073010