Frederic M. Scherer on vertical agreements: staking out the middle ground on resale price maintenance

Autori/Curatori Kenneth G. Elzinga
Anno di pubblicazione 2014 Fascicolo 2014/1 Lingua Inglese
Numero pagine 15 P. 105-119 Dimensione file 57 KB
DOI 10.3280/POLI2014-001006
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This paper describes the influence of Frederic M. Scherer in the field of Industrial Organization. The emphasis is on Scherer’s research with regard to vertical agreements between a manufacturer and its downstream vendors, with particular focus on Scherer’s writings about resale price maintenance (RPM). Scherer’s views on RPM agreements are contrasted with the Chicago school’s liberality and the Warren Court’s stringency, showing how Scherer staked out a middle ground. The paper also assesses the influence of Scherer in moving US antitrust policy from its historic stance of treating RPM as per se illegal to its current treatment under the rule of reason.

Keywords:Mantenimento dei prezzi di rivendita, scuola di Chicago, free rider, giudizio Leegin

Jel codes:L42, B31

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Kenneth G. Elzinga, Frederic M. Scherer on vertical agreements: staking out the middle ground on resale price maintenance in "ECONOMIA E POLITICA INDUSTRIALE " 1/2014, pp 105-119, DOI: 10.3280/POLI2014-001006