The exemplary and the right. Contemporary virtue ethics, action guidance, and action assessment

Titolo Rivista RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA
Autori/Curatori Maria Silvia Vaccarezza
Anno di pubblicazione 2023 Fascicolo 2023/1 Lingua Inglese
Numero pagine 17 P. 148-164 Dimensione file 208 KB
DOI 10.3280/SF2023-001010
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In this paper, I will account for the importance of the notion of exemplarity within the contemporary virtue-­ethical debate, both in its classic formulation (e.g., Hursthouse 1999) and in the recent exemplarist moral theory advanced by Linda T. Zagzebski (2015;; 2017). Despite their differences, which I will discuss extensively, both theories are centered on a characterization of an exemplary virtuous agent that serves as a standard for determining what, in a given situation, is right, wrong, dutiful and forbidden. The first two sections will be devoted to an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of these two approaches. In the third, I will propose a different role of radical (i.e., exceptional) individuals, i.e., saints and heroes, within a virtue-ethical theory of right action.

Keywords:virtue ethics, exemplarism, right act, moral saints, moral heroes

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Maria Silvia Vaccarezza, The exemplary and the right. Contemporary virtue ethics, action guidance, and action assessment in "RIVISTA DI STORIA DELLA FILOSOFIA" 1/2023, pp 148-164, DOI: 10.3280/SF2023-001010