Can Wittgenstein be called a pragmatist?

Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Danièle Moyal-Sharrock
Publishing Year 2017 Issue 2016/3
Language English Pages 19 P. 67-85 File size 218 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2016-003005
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When Wittgenstein is called a pragmatist, it is usually with qualification. In this paper, I examine some of the criteria used to relate Wittgenstein to pragmatism (primacy of action, anti-foundationalism, fallibilism), and conclude that inasmuch as Wittgenstein is neither an anti-foundationalist nor a fallibilist, there may not be sufficient grounds to call him a pragmatist. But nothing stands in the way of considering him a full-fledged enactivist.

Keywords: Wittgenstein, Pragmatism, Enactivism, Foundationalism, Fallibilism.

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Danièle Moyal-Sharrock, Can Wittgenstein be called a pragmatist? in "PARADIGMI" 3/2016, pp 67-85, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2016-003005