Reductionist or systemic model? Some cues for a reflection

Journal title EPISTEMOLOGIA
Author/s Aldo Stella
Publishing Year 2015 Issue 2015/1 Language Italian
Pages 18 P. 81-98 File size 112 KB
DOI 10.3280/EPIS2015-001006
DOI is like a bar code for intellectual property: to have more infomation click here

Below, you can see the article first page

If you want to buy this article in PDF format, you can do it, following the instructions to buy download credits

Article preview

FrancoAngeli is member of Publishers International Linking Association, Inc (PILA), a not-for-profit association which run the CrossRef service enabling links to and from online scholarly content.

Starting from two articles written by Bottaccioli and Villani we discuss the reductionist and systemic models and we highlight how they need to be integrated, rather than opposed, when we take into account the concept of relation. The relation which is used in the systemic model is established only by relying on its terms, which in turn are appreciated by the reductionist model, these terms however in order to represent a determined unity cannot but be in a relation, because to determine is to differentiate. Thus interpreted, i.e. as a mono-dyadic construct, relation appears to be a circle, because it is constructed by presupposing those very terms by which it is presupposed. Therefore we conclude by affirming the need for interpreting the relation not as a status but as the act of referring of every determined being, in such a way that also the integration of the two models must be understood not as a relation which maintains its terms, but as their reciprocal overcoming in a unity of meaning which comprises them and gives them a new meaning.

Keywords: Reductionist model, systemic model, relation, construct, integration, act.

  1. Aristotele. Metaphysica (trad. it. Metafisica, Milano, Rusconi, 1978).
  2. Armstrong D.M. (1989). Universals: An Opinionated Introduction, Boulder, Westview Press.
  3. Bateson G. (1972). Steps to an Ecology of Mind: Collected Essays in Anthropology, Psychiatry, Evolution, and Epistemology, Chicago, University of Chicago Press (trad. it Verso un’ecologia della mente, Milano, Adelphi, 1977).
  4. Bertalanffy von L. (1968). General System Theory. Foundations, Development, Applications, New York, George Braziller (trad. it. Teoria generale dei sistemi, Milano, Mondadori, 1983). Bottaccioli F. (2014). La fine della grande illusione del riduzionismo in biologia e in medicina, Epistemologia, 37(1), pp. 5-21.
  5. Bradley F.H. (1893). Appearance and Reality, London, S. Sonnenschein (trad. it., da cui si cita, Apparenza e realtà, Milano, Rusconi, 1984).
  6. Calemi F.F (2010). La disputa nominalisti-universalisti, APhEx Portale Italiano di Filosofia Analitica, 1, pp. 34-57.
  7. Calemi F.F. (2013). Teorie realistiche dell’istanziazione. In Mari G., Minazzi F., Negro M., Vinti C. (a cura di), Epistemologia e soggettività. Oltre il relativismo, Firenze, Firenze University Press, pp. 39-52.
  8. Calogero G. (1968). I fondamenti della logica aristotelica, Firenze, La Nuova Italia.
  9. Cimmino L. (2009). Il cemento dell’universo. Riflessioni su F.H. Bradley, Siena, Cantagalli.
  10. Damasio A. (1994). Descartes’ Error. Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain, New York, Grosset/Putnam (trad. it. L’errore di Cartesio. Emozione, ragione e cervello umano, Milano, Adelphi, 1995).
  11. Davidson D. (1970). Mental Events. In Foster L., Swanson J.W. (eds.), Experience and Theory, Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, pp. 79-101 (trad. it. Eventi mentali, in Davidson D., Azioni ed eventi, Bologna, il Mulino, 1992).
  12. Dennett D.C. (1991). Consciousness explained, New York / Boston / London, Little Brown and Company (trad. it., da cui si cita, Coscienza. Che cosa è?, Roma / Bari, Laterza, 2009).
  13. Dewey J., Bentley A.F. (1946). Knowing and the Known, Boston, The Beacon Press (trad. it. Conoscenza e transazione, Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1974).
  14. Gaskin R. (1995). Bradley’s Regress, the Copula and the Unity of the Proposition, Philosophical Quarterly, 45(179), pp. 161-180.
  15. Hartmann von N. (1935). Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, Berlin / Leipzig, Walter de Gruyter & Co (trad. it., da cui si cita, La Fondazione dell’Ontologia, Milano, Fratelli Fabbri, 1963).
  16. Heidegger M. (1927). Sein und Zeit, Tübingen, Neomarius (trad. it. Essere e tempo, Milano /Roma, Fratelli Bocca, 1953).
  17. Moore G.E. (1903). The Refutation of Idealism, Mind, 12(48), pp. 433-453.
  18. Morin E. (1990). Introduction à la pensée complexe, Paris, Edition du Seuil (trad. it. Introduzione al pensiero complesso, Milano, Sperling & Kupfer, 1993).
  19. Orilia F. (2006). Stati di cose, esemplificazione e regresso in Bradley, Rivista di Filosofia, 97(3), pp. 349-385.
  20. Platone. Parmenides (trad. it. Parmenide, Roma / Bari, Laterza, 1976).
  21. Quine W.V.O. (1969). Epistemology Naturalized. In Quine W.V.O., Ontological Relativity and Other Essays, New York, Columbia University Press (trad. it. Relatività ontologica e altri saggi, Roma, Armando, 1986).
  22. Quine W.V.O. (1975). The nature of natural Knowledge. In Guttelpan S. (ed.), Mind and Language: Wolfson College Lectures, Oxford, Oxford University Press (trad. it. in Quine W.V.O, Saggi filosofici 1970-1981, Roma, Armando, 1982).
  23. Ryle G. (1949). The concept of Mind, London, Hutchinson (trad. it. Lo spirito come comportamento, Torino, Einaudi, 1955).
  24. Russell B.A.W. (1903). The Principles of Mathematics, Cambridge, University Press, Cambridge (trad. it. I principi della matematica, Roma, Newton Compton Italiana, 1971).
  25. Russell B.A.W. (1956). Logic and Knowledge: Essays 1901-1950, New York, The Macmillan Company (trad. it. Logica e conoscenza, Milano, Longanesi, 1961).
  26. Russell B.A.W., Whitehead, A.N. (1910). Principia Mathematica, 3 vols., Cambridge, Cambridge University Press (trad. it. Principia Mathematica, Milano, Longanesi, 1963).
  27. Searle J.R. (1997). The Mystery of Consciousness, New York, New York Review of Books (trad. it. Il mistero della coscienza, Milano, Cortina, 1998). Searle J.R. (2004). Mind. A Brief Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press (trad. it. La mente, Milano, Cortina, 2005).
  28. Severino E. (1958). La struttura originaria, Brescia, La Scuola; 2a edizione, Adelphi, Milano 1981.
  29. Stella A. (1995). La relazione e il valore, Milano, Guerini Scientifica.
  30. Stella A. (2014). Il concetto di relazione. Costrutto o atto?, Giornale di Metafisica, 36(1), pp. 259-273.
  31. Strawson P.F. (1959). Individual: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphysics, London, Methuen & Co.
  32. Vallicella W.F. (2002). Relations, monism, and the vindication of Bradley’s regress, Dialectica, 56(1), pp. 3-35.
  33. Vallicella W.F. (2004). Bradley’s Regress and Relation-Instances, Modern Schoolman, 81(3), pp.159-183.
  34. Villani G. (2014). L’approccio sistemico della chimica al concetto di vita, Epistemologia, 37(1), pp. 22-36.
  35. Visalberghi A. (1958). Il concetto di “transazione”. In Rossi-Landi F. (ed.), Il pensiero americano contemporaneo, Milano, Edizioni di Comunità

Aldo Stella, Modello riduzionistico o modello sistemico? Spunti per una riflessione in "EPISTEMOLOGIA" 1/2015, pp 81-98, DOI: 10.3280/EPIS2015-001006