Governance specifics in cooperative banks. or, why do managers in italian cooperative banks "survive" longer

Author/s Mitja Stefancic
Publishing Year 2013 Issue 2012/107 Language English
Pages 21 P. 85-105 File size 421 KB
DOI 10.3280/STE2012-107004
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This paper investigates management turnover in Italian banks by means of the survival analysis method. The study tests whether management turnover differs according to different types of banks; and whether top managers in non-commercial banks are more likely to stay on in their managerial position - to "survive" longer than top managers in commercial banks. Data from 1993 to 2003 have been considered for all Italian banks. On the one hand, results confirm that the juridical form of banks is directly related to management turnover. Cooperative banks show a superior survival probability in comparison to other banks. On the other hand, results show that in Italian banks, management turnover is less frequent for managers with a high level of education and with honorific titles. Top managers in cooperative banks tend to survive longer than top managers in commercial banks also when bank performance is below average. Finally, the paper evaluates the impact of business cycles on management turnover.

Keywords: Italian banks; juridical form of banks; governance issues in cooperative banks; management turnover; disciplinary mechanisms; survival analysis

Jel codes: D21, G21, J63

  • Co-operative Banking Networks in Europe Federica Poli, pp.1 (ISBN:978-3-030-21698-6)

Mitja Stefancic, Governance specifics in cooperative banks. or, why do managers in italian cooperative banks "survive" longer in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 107/2012, pp 85-105, DOI: 10.3280/STE2012-107004