Una nota su incentivi manageriali e altruismo in oligopolio

Author/s Riccardo Martina
Publishing Year 2014 Issue 2013/110 Language Italian
Pages 10 P. 105-114 File size 75 KB
DOI 10.3280/STE2013-110006
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This note explores the impact of reciprocal altruism on the equilibrium outcome of a two-stage oligopoly game with managerial frms. The structure of the classical two-stage oligopoly game with managerial incentives with strategic substitutes (quantity competition) generates a typical "distortion" at equilibrium where quantities turn out to be larger than the Cournot-Nash equilibrium ones. This paper shows that when firm owners’ objective functions are defined according to a reciprocal altruism hypothesis, the Cournot outcome of the static game can be achieved despite the two stage structure of the model. This result holds true when the analysis is extended to an N symmetric firms context.

Keywords: Oligopoly, Altruism, Incentives, Managerial Firms, Multi-Stage Games, Delegation.

Jel codes: L13, L20.

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Riccardo Martina, Una nota su incentivi manageriali e altruismo in oligopolio in "STUDI ECONOMICI " 110/2013, pp 105-114, DOI: 10.3280/STE2013-110006