Husserl and the Problem of the Phenomenal Consciousness

Journal title PARADIGMI
Author/s Roberta Lanfredini
Publishing Year 2015 Issue 2014/3 Language Italian
Pages 18 P. 55-72 File size 84 KB
DOI 10.3280/PARA2014-003005
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The hard problem of the philosophy of mind - i.e. the problem of internal phenomenal content of perception (qualia) - is still considered, for the most, unsolvable. This paper deals with a phenomenological analysis of the main problems linked with the puzzling qualia problem. These problems are: i) the relationship between intentional mind and consciousness, ii) the epistemological and ontological reductionism, iii) the anti-reductionist naturalism, iiii) the eliminativism, iiiii) the embodied and ecological mind. The paper main conclusion is that phenomenology is different mainly from a methological point of view, adopting a horizontal and integrated model in place of a vertical and dichotomic one.

Keywords: Qualia, consciousness, intentionality, reductionism, embodied mind, integrated model.

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Roberta Lanfredini, Husserl e il problema della coscienza fenomenica in "PARADIGMI" 3/2014, pp 55-72, DOI: 10.3280/PARA2014-003005