Journal title ECONOMIA PUBBLICA
Author/s Michele Limosani, Dario Maimone, Ansaldo Patti, Pietro Navarra
Publishing Year 2003 Issue 2003/5 Language Italian
Pages 14 P. File size 73 KB
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Did the judicial operation of Mani puliteaffect local policy decisions? The aim of this study is to provide an answer to this question. We describe the relationship between voters and elected representatives in a simple principal-agent setting. We use this framework to develop a theory analysing the impact produced by tighter judicial controls on this agency relationship. Our theoretical model allows us to formulate some hypotheses on the possible policy consequences associated to the judicial interventions in the Tangentopoliyears. Our theoretical hypotheses are then tested empirically. The results of the empirical investigation tell us that higher monitoring in the form of tighter judicial controls crowded-out public investment spending at local level. This effect, however, was not uniformly distributed across Italian regions.
Michele Limosani, Dario Maimone, Ansaldo Patti, Pietro Navarra, Il rapporto di agenzia tra elettori ed eletti e gli effetti di Mani pulite sulle decisioni di politica economica locale in "ECONOMIA PUBBLICA " 5/2003, pp , DOI: